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THE LAW OF ARREST IN MARYLAND

By DAvID KAUFFMAN*
In the administration of criminal justice, the law of
arrest has always loomed large. As the first step in bringing the purported criminal to task, legal significance, both
in the adjective and substantive phases, has been attached
to the process of arrest. There is much that has been said
and written on the law of arrest and these expressions of
what the law is and what the law should be have had a
surprising stimulus on the legislatures of our country.'
Thus we find that many of our states possess codifications
of one sort or another on the subject. There is no great
magic to the word "codification" and many of these codes
cannot be deemed to be products of any profound thought.
There is however, the merit of discussion, profound or
otherwise, of these codes before they are enacted into law.
Such discussion necessarily deals with social aspects which
the courts, even in their most helpful or most determined
use of judicial fiat, cannot be presumed to have examined
in full. Still the codifications are replete with caveats and
fields left unexplored and the courts must constantly peer
into these crevices and interstices.
Maryland, on the other hand, has no statutory law of
arrest worthy of the name.2 Here, as in many other phases
* Of the Cumberland, Md., Bar. A.B., 1936, University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B., 1939, Harvard University.
I For a general review of the law of arrest with commentaries and list
of authorities peruse A. L. I. CODE CBIM. PR0C. (1930). Since publication
many states have passed legislation on the topic of arrest; notably, California, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, New York and Texas.
This article Is confined to arrest in criminal cases.
2 Scattered throughout the Md. Code (1939) are references to peace
officers and manner of arrest. There is no topic of arrest as such, and the
treatment is purely Incidental. Among others, there may be noted the
following scattered references to arrest: Md. Const., Art. 4, Sec. 6 (judges
as conservators of the peace) ; Md. Const., Art. 4, Sec. 42 (powers of
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of law, reliance is placed on judicial interpretation of the
status quo as the occasion, spurred by litigation, arises. In
Maryland, therefore, we have the two-fold problem of
ascertaining the state of the law and further ascertaining
the merits and demerits of this state. In the code states,
the first problem is considerably narrowed.
So many of the codes appear to be merely declaratory
of the common law that one who believes in the legislative
process as a system of considered thought is struck with
the sagacity and enterprise of the judicial process; a process which saw the judiciary viewing the problem so intelligently that its outpourings remain as law today. Unfortunately, so to attribute almost divine powers of foresight
is to fail to take into account the frailty of the human
being, the inertia of the human mind, the speed of the
mechanical process and the effect of the "seductive cliches"
judicially propounded. In short, an observance of police
usage and a reading of cases reveal many defects in the
law of arrest, code or otherwise.
There is now being undertaken by Professor Sam Bass
Warner of the Harvard Law School an investigation of
modern police practices in large cities.' Professor Warner
was delegated this task by the Interstate Commission on
Crime-that Commission being of the opinion that illegal
arrests were the rule rather than the exception. Such a
justices and constables) ; Md. Code (1939) Art. 20, See. 4 (constable)
Art. 20, Secs. 7, 22-27 (constable) ; Art. 23, Secs. 337-344 (private police);
Art. 27, See. 364 (railroad employees) ; Art. 27, Sec. 458 (institution officials) ; Art. 33, Secs. 104, 243 (election judges) ; Art. 39, Sees. 4, 8, 9 (fish
conservators) ; Art. 39A, Secs. 5, 6, 21 (forest wardens) ; Art. 41, Sec. 84
(parole officer) ; Art. 48A, See. 69 (insurance commissioner); Art. 56,
Sees. 6, 27-30 (license violators) ; Art. 56, Sec. 150 (motorcycle police);
Art. 56, Sec. 194 (4B) (smoke screens); Art. 59, See. 33 (institution attendants) ; Art. 72, Secs. 29, 31 (oyster laws); Art. 77, Sees. 216, 217
(school attendance officer) ; Art. 84, See. 5 (master of vessel); Art. 87,
Secs. 9, 10 (sheriff's liability) ; Art. 88B, Secs. 1-30 (State Police) ; Art. 99,
Sees. 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 73 (game wardens).
"Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 151.
The writer has had the privilege of reading Preliminary Report of Sam
Bass Warner to Committee on Arrest of Interstate Commission on Crime,
August 5, 1940, and it is sincerely hoped that this report will soon be made
available to the public, lay and legal, as it has to the Commission and
to the American Civil Liberties Union. Warner was chief draftsman of the
model Sabotage Prevention Act. Note his treatment of the arrest aspect of
the Act in Warner, The Model Sabotage Prevention Act (1941) 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 602, 610, 630.
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state of affairs, if true, commands our attention because it
reveals that the law-as enunciated either by statute or
common law-has not found a common meeting ground
for the protagonist of protection and the antagonist of
encroachment on personal liberty. Perhaps the Commission was correct in its initial surmise for the roots of the
law of arrest lie deep in an age where there were no official
police departments and a person claiming to arrest might
be a kidnapper; where jails were unbelievably squalid and
such pesthouses that "gaol fever", a virulent typhus,
caused one out of every four in prison to die there; where
bail was most difficult to obtain even for comparatively
minor offenses; and where corrupt jailers instituted a
system of fees for the slightest action on their part which
saw many sold into servitude to pay such fees.4 But these
conditions no longer exist and if there are strangulating
restrictions on the law of arrest, born of response to these
conditions, they should be removed. The purpose of this
paper is to examine in part the scope of the Maryland
law of arrest with its strictures-an analysis not entirely
free from bias. The reader will be constantly subjected
not only to the writer's idea of what the law is, but also his
notion as to the glaring defects and shining lights such law
possesses.
I
IN GENERAL

All arrests are made in either of two ways- (1) with a
warrant, (2) without a warrant. Either arrest may be
legal, either arrest may be illegal. These two types of
arrest share some similar problems; they have some dissimilar problems. Broadly speaking, arrest without a warrant is the recourse in the more dire and extreme circumstances-arrest with a warrant under more careful scrutiny and tempered observation. Arrest with a warrant
smacks of the ritualistic; hence, it is a comparatively
simple problem to ascertain if these formalities and rites
'WEBB,
ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER LocAL GOVERNMENT (1922); Hall,
Legal and Social Aspect8 of Arrest Without a Warrant (1936) 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 566; Warner, supra n. 3, 151, 152.
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have met with compliance-arrest without a warrant is a
more difficult question because the rules and restraints
on its legality are not as readily resolved. The factual
issue on which the legality of the arrest turns is ordinarily
a matter of record in arrest with the warrant, i. e., the
warrant itself; arrest without a warrant often calls for an
insight of conduct and manner, i. e., how reasonable was a
belief. Each requires a person to do the arresting, a person to be arrested and hereafter these will be called the
arrester and arrestee respectively. This is a nomenclature
of some favor with courts and writers, if it is not enthusiastically approved by lexicographers. 5
Such immunities as exist from criminal arrest may be
confined to diplomatic agents and apply in either type of
arrest.6
A.

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction must exist in the arrester. In arrest with
a warrant, we find that besides jurisdiction in the party
executing the warrant, there also must be jurisdiction in
the issuing party to send out the warrant.7 Without a
warrant, there is no issuer and the arrester's jurisdiction
is enough. If the crime was not committed wholly or
partly within the state in which arrest is sought, the necessity of jurisdiction is even more troublesome. Wanted
men cannot flee with impunity to neighboring states, but
the source of authority by which men may arrest those
who have fled is rather vague in our jurisdictional concept.
Jurisdiction over the person in the sense of having the
power to seize him is apparently enough if the arrester
I E. g., State, ex rel. Wong You, v. District Court, 106 Mont. 347, 351, 78
P. (2d) 353, 354 (1938) ; Perkins, The Law of Arrest (1940) 25 Iowa L.
Rev. 201, a most comprehensive and excellent article cited extensively
herein. See also Hall, supra n. 4.
6 United States v. Ortega, 4 Wash. 531, 534 (1825) ; U. S. C. A. Title 22,
Sec. 252; but there is no immunity as to consuls (unless they are also
chargd d'affaires).
Coppell v. Hall, 74 U. S. 542, 553, 7 Wall, 542, 19
L. Ed. 244 (1886); VooaHEEs, THE LAW OF ARREST (2d ed. 1915) 211. As
stated, arrest in civil cases is not discussed, hence the varying degrees
of immunity from such arrest enjoyed by jurors, lawyers, litigants,
witnesses, judges, congressmen, and electors are not examined.
7 Re Crawford, 148 Wash. 265, 268 Pac. 871 (1928).
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knows or is reasonably suspicious of a crime for which
arrest may be made.8 Some statutes add a hindrance by
requiring a charge, formal to some degree, to be made in
the state of the commission of the crime before the arrest
can be deemed proper.9 If the crime was committed within
the state in which arrest is sought but the arrestee is fleeing that state, jurisdiction to cross borders and state lines
is dependent on whether the pursuing arrester's state
clings to the notion of territorial limits or has expanded
jurisdiction by means of a "Fresh Pursuit" act,1" permitting
the arrester to stalk the fugitive to any distance in a foreign state so long as he acted without unreasonable delay,
although the pursuit was not instant. Maryland possesses
a Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, as do all of the states
bordering Maryland. The Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit
applies to either type of arrest. Later sections will deal
with some of the aspects of jurisdiction with greater particularity. The jurisdictional phase of arrest is often styled
a bailiwick question. The bailiwick for a city or town
policeman is the city or town; for the sheriff or constable
of the county, it is the county; for the officer of the state,
it is the state." We shall find that not only is this concept
I RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 119, comment e; Williams v. Commonwealth, 142 Va. 667, 128 S. E. 572 (1925) ; State, ex rel. Brown v. Spangler,
197 S. E. 360 (W. Va. 1938) ; see also MicH. CoMP. LAWS (1929) Mason's
1935 Supp., Sec. 17149, Sub-section F, apparently designed to remedy the
court's painful view in Malcolmson v. Scott, 56 Mich. 459, 23 N. W. 166
(1885). But cf. State v. Shelton, 79 N. C. 605 (1878).
Of course, this is pertinent only to arrests without warrant as arrest by
warrant can have no extra-territorial strength. Kendall v. Aleshire, 28
Neb. 707, 45 N. W. 167 (1890) ; Stuart v. Mayberry, 105 Okla. 13, 231 Pac.
491 (1924).
9 Matter of Strauss, 197 U. S. 324, 331 (1905) ; Eo parte White, 49 Cal.
433 (1875); State v. Hufford, 28 Iowa 391 (1869); Forbes v. Hicks, 27
Neb. 111, 42 N. W. 898 (1889).
10 At least 23 states now possess this act. THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE
CRIME CONTROL (1938) ; Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Secs. 638-645.
If a state possesses the Fresh Pursuit Act, can peace officers in fresh
pursuit cross lines and arrest outside their own bailiwick but within their
own state; e. g., from one county to another? Quaere. See Ops. Atty.
Gen., Baltimore Daily Record, Aug. 23, 1940.
"ICity or town: Sossamon v. Cruse, 133 N. C. 470, 45 S. E. 757 (1903)
Karney v. Boyd, 186 Wis. 594, 203 N. W. 371 (1925); Commonwealth v.
Lentz, 106 Pa. 643, 645 (1884).
County: York v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 360 (1884); Henson v. State,
120 Tex. Cr. R. 176, 49 S. W. (2d) 463 (1932).
State: E. g., IOWA CODE (1935) Sec. 13410; MICH. COMP. LAWS (1929)
See. 558.
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broadened by the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit, but that
arrest with a warrant may also enlarge the bailiwick. 2
B. Notice.
In either type of arrest, notice by words or conduct is
to be given to the arrestee by the arrester. 18 Such notice
is to include a proclamation or evincement of the authority
of the arrester with a concomitant indication of the arrester's intent or purpose and the reason for the arrest."4
Rules for notice vary slightly in the types of arrest as discussion following will reveal. On the whole, it is safe to
say that notice may be dispensed with if such notice may
be dangerous to the arrester, dangerous to a third person,
or a formality which may permit the arrestee to escape. 5
Nor, in the vast majority of states, need notice be given
before the apprehension is made. The arrester may take
the arrestee into custody and then give notice. 6 A requirement of notice preliminary to or concurrent with
arrest would undoubtedly increase an arrestee's chance
to elude his arrester.
C. Disposing of the Prisoner
Having taken the arrestee into custody, it behooves the
arrester to present him before one vested with the authority to advance the arrestee to a further stage in a prosecution for crime. The arrester must act promptly, hence
the nearest or most accessible magistrate would apparently
be the logical authority to whom to submit the arrestee.
This precept of action of no unreasonable delay is followed
in arrests without a warrant, 7 further extended by per1

lnfra circa notes 45-48.

RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 128.
14 A. L. I. CODE CRIM. PROC., supra n. 1, 248; Presley v. State, 75 Fla.
1s

434, 78 So. 532 (1918).
15 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 128; State v. Gay, 18 Mont. 51, 44
Pac. 411 (1896) ; Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 238 S. W. 94 (1891) ; Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 190, 130 S. W. (2d) 31 (1939).
10 State v. Fador, 222 Ia. 134, 268 N. W. 625 (1936) ; see State v. Brown,
91 W. Va. 709, 715, 114 S. E. 372, 374 (1922). Contra: Adams v. State, 175
Ala. 8, 57 So. 591 (1912).
17 Twilley v. State, 77 Md. 252, 26 Atl. 286 (1893) ; Oxford v. Berry, 204
Mich. 197, 170 N. W. 83 (1918) ; Singerman v. Burns Detective Agency, 219
N. Y. Supp. 724, 219 App. Div. 291 (1st Dep't 1927) ; Floyd v. Railway Co.,
112 W. Va. 66, 164 S. E. 28 (1932).
See also Md. Code Public Local Laws (Flack, 1930) Art. 4, Sec. 760.
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mitting a private person making such an arrest to turn
the arrestee over to a peace officer.'
In arrest by a warrant however, there is usually an express command of the
authority to whom the arrestee must be taken, substituting
the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the event of
unavailability of the named authority. 9 Magistrates need
not be awakened in the middle of the night so long as an
expeditious bringing of the arrestee before the magistrate
is made.
D. Arrest Situations-Definitions
The use of the word "arrest" brings to mind the picture
of an officer of the law firmly seizing a suspect and informing him that he is under arrest. There are sequences
to the picture it is necessary to portray.
When a person is approached by another
and questioned as to his actions or identity, he is merely being
accosted and not arrested.2 0 If a person having been accosted is asked to go down to the police station with the
officer, and he complies without feeling that coercion is
being asserted to take him to the station, he is merely cooperating in response to a request and is not being arrested.2 ' When one is issued a ticket for a traffic violation,
one is not being arrested but is merely being served notice
that he has committed an offense which may be tried summarily by a magistrate, and the ticket amounts to a summons for such summary trial.2 2 If the summons is not
obeyed, an arrest will follow. If a person's car or truck
's

19

A. L. I., CODE CRIm. Paoc., supra n. 1, 260-61.

Id. at 201. Cf. Francisco v. State, 24 N. J. L. 30 (1853) ; State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S. E. 518 (1932) ; Hargus v. State, 54 Pac. (2d)
211, (Okla. Crim. App. 1935).
" State v. Gulczynskl, 2 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 120, 120 A. 88 (1922) ; see
Note (1938) 37 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 313. However, flight or evasion may
indicate consciousness of guilt which will justify one in reasonably believing the person accosted is a criminal.
21 Rezeau v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 32.3, 254 S. W. 574 (1923).
22 A. L. I., CODE CRIM. PROC., supra 217; Long v. Ansell, 63 App. D. C.
68, 69 F. (2d) 386 (1934) brings out the distinction albeit the summons
therein is a civil process.
To be more neatly precise, one should differentiate between a ticket and
a summons further. A ticket is a command issued by police authority,
a summons by court authority. Tickets are by far more common for enforcement of traffic law.
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is stopped in order to inspect for Japanese beetles, possible
lack of proper equipment, or weight of car or truck, an
arrest is not being made. He is being detained in the exercise of the privilege of inspection, and such detention does
not constitute an arrest.2 A similar detention in the exercise of privilege of investigation is that which sees material
witnesses kept at the scene of the crime for questioning.24
If either of these detentions is unreasonably protracted, an
imprisonment has been made.25 The crime of misprision
(refusing to testify as to knowledge of a crime) has long
since gone from our law, supplanted in large part by the
accessory after the fact concept, if any aid has been vouchsafed the principal. However, it is possible to arrest material witnesses if they indicate defiant unwillingness to aid
the court in its delving through obfuscated facts.26
This variety of arrest situations indicates the nebulous
ground on which any definition of arrest must rest. Any
definition must give rise to qualifications, but for present
purposes, the definition set forth by the Court in B. & 0.
R. R. v. Cain2 7 will suffice. The Court said arrest is the
detention of the offender for the purposes of prosecuting
him for crime. The elusive word in this definition is "detention". Detention has been interpreted as requiring
touching of the arrestee by the arrester. Later cases conceded a broader interpretation, permitting detention to
apply where there was no touching but the offender submitted to the arrester upon notice of the arrest. Either

11 Only if they are aware of or suspect the violation in some manner so
they may call it a misdemeanor in their presence or view. Otherwise, special statutes are needed. However, peace officers ordinarily have the
privilege of inspection without statutory authorization. Head v. State,
131 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 96 S. W. (2d) 981 (1936).
24 The detention in this case is obviously not to subject the detained one
to prosecution but to procure assistance and information. See 2 HALE,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 281-2.
25Subject to the rules set out in ]RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Secs. 35,
36. Moreover, this imprisonment must necessarily be a false imprisonment if notice of arrest and evincement of authority and reason have not
been given.
20 Statutes declaratory of the common law are: Md. Code (1939) Art.
35, Sec. 14; IOWA CODE (1935) Sec. 13550. But not if the crime is less
than a felony, said the court in N. Y. P. & N. R. R. Co. v. Waldron, 116
Md. 441, 82 Atl. 709, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502 (1911)-however, note that
a private person was making the arrest.
2181 Md. 87, 31 Ati. 801, 28 L. R. A. 688 (1895).
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touching or submission meets the detention requirement
of the arrest today."8 We add to our first picture of the
suspect being seized, another picture in which the arrester
notifies the arrestee and the arrestee submits to the arrest
in some manner, words, or conduct.2 9 Note the important
hiatus here. An arrester approaches an offending arrestee.
Assuming no submission and assuming the arrester does
not wish to harm the arrestee, must a game of tag be successfully completed in order to effect an arrest? The
answer seems to be in the affirmative. Analytically, the
hiatus should not exist, and the fact that the arrester has
reached out his hand and touched the arrestee should not
be a sine qua non of arrest. Detention looks to possession
or seizure of the body of the arrestee; intent to possess
being assumed, the power to possess as in various phases
of property law has been defined as manual seizure or circumstances in which obstacles to manual seizure may be
fairly dismissed as negligible."
This would cover the
touching, the submission and also the hiatus, where the
very slight act of reaching across a small space and touching a person has been omitted. It is only fair to the previous definition to note that any touching, however momentary or fragmentary, is sufficient.31
The police practice of "frisking" deserves scrutiny.
This passing of one's hands over the clothing of a suspect
in order to determine whether or not concealed weapons
are being carried is held to be an arrest in many states.82
In many others, it is not an arrest but it is looked on as an
28The historical foundation case is Genner v. Sparkes, 2 Salk. 586, 91
Eng. Rep. 74 (Com. P. 1704). Accord: Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Carlock, 196 Ala. 659, 72 So. 261 (1916) ; also see Kentucky Banker's Assn. v.
Cassady, 264 Ky. 351, 94 S. W. (2d) 622 (1936) ; State v Dunivan, 217 Mo.
App. 548, 269 S. W. 415 (1925).
29 State v. Beckendorf, 79 Utah 360, 10 P. (2d) 1073 (1932).
80 The general phraseology is universal in defining the power to possess-the words are substantially Prof. E. H. Warren's of Harvard Law Schoolunpublished lectures in his first year course on Property and in Warren,
Trover and Conversion, p. 18.
81Whithead v. Keyes, 85 Mass. 495 (1862); State, ex rel. Sadler, v.
District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 225 P. 1000 (1924).
32 Note, (1934) 92 A. L. R. 490; Warner, supra n. 3, 153. By far the
better view would seem to be that expressed in Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal.
App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (1908) in which frisking was condoned. Cogent arguments appear In Insan, Firearms and Legal Doctrine (1933) 7 Tul. L. Rev.
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illegal search since an arrest has not been made to which
the search is incidental."
In the latter case, when an
officer accosts one suspected of carrying concealed weapons, he is placed in the position of choosing between two
alternatives:
(a) He may arrest the suspected offender; thus protecting himself from injury but subjecting himself to a
possible action for damages on the false arrest, or
(b) He will not "frisk" him, protecting himself against
possible damage suit for false arrest but subjecting
himself to a strategic disadvantage in the event the
suspect is armed and a dangerous character.
Here is one case where the law is not only obsolete but
acts so as to compel the law-enforcement officer to violate
the law. There is a definite need for recognition of this
intolerable position. Practically, the arrester worries about
his safety first, his civil liability after. The inconvenience
and humiliation of a frisking is so inconsequential that to
term it accosting, without calling it either an arrest or
illegal search without arrest, would not seem seriously to
offend anyone, and would merely accept as law that which
through the expediency of self-defense has become practice.
E. Results of an Illegal Arrest
The making of an illegal arrest is a springboard for
actions sounding in trespass. These trespassory suits may
be called assault,"4 assault and battery, 5 false arrest, 6 false
"' People v. Margelis, 217 Mich. 423, 186 N. W. 488 (1922); People v.
Marendi, 213 N. Y. 600, 107 N. E. 1058, 1060 (1915) ; Note (1940) 54 Harv.
L. Rev. 127.
31 State v. Fador, 222 Iowa 134, 268 N. W. 625 (1936); Sossamon v.
Cruse, 133 N. C. 470, 45 S. U. 757 (1903).
85 Roddy v. Finnegan, 43 Md. 490 (1875) ; Karney v. Boyd, 186 Wis. 594,
203 N. W. 371 (1925) ; Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 441, 447; 124 S. E.
242, 244 (1924).
88 A far from water-tight conipartment often invoked by the court as a
synonym for the other actions mentioned. See 1 PFo, PLEADING AND PACrICE (Tiffany ed. 1925) Sec. 229 for a discussion of results of Illegal arrest.
Wilson Line v. Brown, 164 Md. 698, 166 A. 426 (1933).
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imprisonment," or a variety of names. There are too
many suits based on illegal arrest to say that a potential
arrester is not concerned with tle repercussions which may
result from an arrest. The arrester may be sued and lose.
He may be sued and settle. He may be sued and be pronounced free from liability. Even in the last case, he will
be out his attorney's fees and possibly costs. If the offender
was guilty and the seizure justified, if not legally sanctioned, any loss on the suit may be merely nominal but this
is indeed an airy argument to an arrester subject to the
idiosyncrasies and sometimes idiocy of a jury. Aside from
the penalties for illegal arrest, such special obsolescence
of the machinery of arrest may take the form of contempt
of the law by the citizenry. If the arrestee in fact is a
proper subject for prosecution, the legality or illegality of
the arrest will make no difference. The law will welcome
with open arms the chance to prosecute, amending the
warrant if necessary, or in arrest without warrant, accepting the gifts placed before it. A warning note should be
sounded-out of an abundance of caution perhaps-to call
attention to the fact that arrest may be legal and yet the
arrestee is innocent, perhaps even entitled to release on a
writ of habeas corpus.38
II
ARREST WITH A WARRANT

The law of arrest with a warrant possesses a disarming
simplicity. Formal requisites for a valid warrant and
execution of the warrant have the force of law behind
them. The enumeration of these formal requisites is a
matter of course but the ratio decidendi is far from a matter of course.
87
Leading false imprisonment case is Pike v. Hanson, 9 N. H. 491
(1838) ; Filer v. Smith, 96 Mich. 347, 55 N. W. 999 (1893).
38 Improper party for prosecution but subject to legal arrest: Bennett
v. Ahrens, 57 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 7th 1932). Conversely, a proper party
for prosecution but subject to illegal arrest: Ex parte Granice, 51 Cal.
See Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Social Problems
375 (1875).
(1936) 3 U. of Chi. L. R. 345, 365.
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Valid Warrants

To be valid, a warrant must:
(1) be issued by a proper authority-such proper
authority may be a justice of the peace or a
magistrate, 39 a court issuing a bench warrant
after indictment by a grand jury,40 a special
court on the premise that contempt of the court
has been indicated by a failure to heed a summons or a particular subpoena,4 a coroner after
an inquest has been resolved.42 To be a proper
authority, the issuer must have jurisdiction, i. e.,
he must be the type of person who may issue
and the offense must
be the type of offense for
43
which he may issue.
(2) be directed to a proper person. Today, a private person is not, in most states, a proper per44
son for direction of a warrant to be executed.
Limitations on this direction vary in different
states. Maryland seems to incline towards (a)
the rule which permits the issuer to direct the
warrant to any peace officer in the state but
requiring that execution of the warrant either
be made in the officer's own county; or, if out of
his county, insisting that a written endorsement
be made on the warrant by a magistrate of the
county in which execution of the warrant is
sought. 41 The broadest rule (b) proclaims the
right of the issuer to direct the warrant to any
peace officer in the state-such warrant to be
executed in any county of the state. 46 A narrower rule (c) directs the warrant to any peace
officer in the state but restricts such peace of3 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY; Bouvism, LAW DIcTIONARy.
See Downs v.
Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A. 653, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 739 (1909).
40 State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 597
(1880); VOORHEES, Op. cit. supra
n. 16, 28.
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S. 204 5 L. Ed. 242 (1821). RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1934) Sec. 112, comment c.
41 State v. Brecourt, 82 Kan. 195, 107 Pac. 763 (1910) 1 BL. COMM. 348.
8
' RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 124, comment d.
"See A. L. I., CODE CRIM. PROC. supra n. 1, 188. Compare early common
law,
2 HALE P. C. 110.
"5 Md. Code (1939) Art. 52, Sec. 15. Opinion Atty Gen. Baltimore Daily
Record, June 24, 1940.
46 State v. Grantham, 30 Ariz. 591, 249 P. 758 (1926) ; McCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 94 S. W. 79 (1906); See Henson v. State, 120 Tex.
Cr. R. 176, 49 S. W. (2d) 463 (1932).
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ficer's execution of the warrant to his own bailiwick.8 a Still another, (d) limits the direction
of the warrant to a peace officer of the particular
county in which the administration of criminal
justice is initiated but allows execution of such
warrant by such peace officer in any county in
the state."" It is true that the rules concerning
the jurisdiction of the officer for execution are
not pertinent to the validity of the warrant in
the direction sense; but, the problem of jurisdiction in the issuer and the problem of jurisdiction
in the person to whom the warrant is issued for
execution are so intertwined that to state them
here, while a deviation from formal requisites
of a warrant, is a logical deviation.
(3)

be issued only on sworn complaint of one who
has information that a crime has been committed and must state that complaint in the
warrant." There is an equivocation in the law
as to whether or not the magistrate can content
himself with such sworn complaint as sufficing
to show proper cause of guilt or whether he
must seek further facts in order to believe such
probable cause exists.49

(4) contain a statement of the offense for which the
person is being arrested. Substantial statement
is enough. One need not allege each element of
a crime.50
, York v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 360 (1884).
17 A. L. I. CODE CRIM. PRoc., 8upra n. 1, 193; Nadeau v. Conn, 142 Wash.
243, 252 P. 913 (1927).
48 Curl v. People, 53 Colo. 578, 127 P.
951 (1912) ; Pearson v. Great
Southern Lumber Co., 134 La. 117, 63 So. 759 (1913) ; Harvey v. Commonwealth, 226 Ky. 36, 10 S. W. (2d) 471 (1928); Salter v. State, 2 Okla.
Cr. R. 464, 102 Pac. 719 (1909) ; Bissell v. Gold, 1 Wend. (Sup. Ct. N. Y.)
210 (1838).
Oral complaint suffices if under oath: Kelly v. State, 151 Md. 87,
133 A. 899 (1926).
494 BL. CoMM. 290.
Analogy of search warrant in Burtch v. Zeuch,
200 Iowa 49, 54, 202 N. W. 542, 544 (1925) ; State v. Frankel and Friedman, Baltimore Daily Record, Nov. 8, 1940.
" Lynchard v. State, 183 Miss. 691, 184 So. 805 (1938). Crichton v.
State, 115 Md. 423, 81 A. 36 (1911) agrees that a description of the offense
is necessary but refuses to grant a writ of certiorari for lack of such
description, since it is possible that the magistrate still has jurisdiction
over arrestee-by virtue of Chapter 444, Acts of 1906 permitting the presiding official to amend the warrant for the purpose of proceeding with
prosecution. This is typical of many other states' attitude.
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(5) contain a command that the purported offender
shall be brought before the magistrate issuing
the warrant or some other magistrate in the
event the issuing magistrate shall not be available: such other magistrate being the nearest
or most accessible magistrate in the county.' 1
(6) contain a statement of the
date when issued
52
and the place where issued.
(7)

contain a distinct identification of the person
to be arrested. This identification shall be made
by the correct name if possible, if not possible,
any name by which the arrestee may be known
or a description
which will enable ready identi58
fication.

(8) be in writing signed by the authority with the
title of his office and an indication that the warrant is issued on behalf of the state, commonwealth, or people.54
These are the formal requisites of a warrant. Possessed
at common law, they are possessed today and have found
their way into almost all form books, text books, and
treatises. Maryland is no exception. 55
B. Apparently Valid Warrants
Requisites for validity of a warrant are readily apparent on the face of a warrant. It would tax criminal procedure unduly if the officer were to be held responsible
for knowledge as to the existence of probable cause, the
propriety of the name or description used in the identifi"1Wright v. State, 177 Md. 230, 236, 9 A. (2d) 253 (1939); Blake v.
Burke, 42 Md. 45 (1875) ; Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 341, 4 A. 285 (1886) ;
Green v. State, 113 Md. 451, 77 A. 677 (1910) ; LATROBE, JUSTICES PRACTICE,
Sec. 1315.
52 1 CHIrY, CRIM. LAw 38.

West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78, 38 L. Ed. 643. 14 S. Ct. 876 (1894)
Blocker v. Clark, 126 Ga. 484, 54 S. E. 1022 (1906).
54 Signature necessary:
Oates v. Bullock, 136 Ala. 537, 33 So. 835
(1903). Name of the state indispensable: Leighton v. Hall, 31 Ill. 108
(1863) ; cf. Hickman v. Griffith, 6 Mo. 37 (1839). Most jurisdictions
regard seal as unnecessary: Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614, 38 L.
Ed. 841, 14 S. Ct. 919 (1893); THOMAS, PROCEDURE IN JUSTICE CASES
(1906) 306; contra, State v. Drake, 36 Me. 366 (1853).
"5HOcHHIMER, CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 1904) 80. Exemplifying the
brushing aside of technicalities and clerical errors are Norwood v. State,
45 Md. 68 (1876) ; and Smith v. Brown, 119 Md. 236, 86 A. 609 (1912).
51
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cation and many other essentials of the warrant. The
escape valve of the officer is that he is free from liability
for executing the warrant if the warrant conforms in fact
to the enumerated essentials for validity or if the warrant
is a reasonable facsimile of a factually valid warrant. The
language the court uses is that the officer is immune if the
warrant is "fair on its face" or "good on its face". 56 The
standard for fair on its face or good on its face is reputedly
objective, for our much-maligned friend, the reasonable
man, appears, but the standard is lax indeed; the defect
of illegality on the warrant must be so palpable to the
reasonable man that on glancing at it, he will see that the
warrant is null and void on its face.57 Obviously, the duty
of inquiry is little and it must be a poorly drawn warrant
indeed to endanger the officer. No doubt, this low standard
is designed to alleviate the risk which the officer undertakes in arrest; since it is held that if the warrant is not
valid nor fair on its face, he acts at his peril in the execution of the warrant and reasonable circumstances will not
5
excuse him.
C.

Execution of the Warrant

If the warrant has validity or the cloak of validity, the
arrest is not yet necessarily lawful. The warrant must be
properly executed. Although, ordinarily, a warrant may
not be directed to any one other than an officer, it is possible for the warrant to be executed by a non-officer.
Deputization of a private person is obvious.5 9 'Moreover,
" Hall v. Hall, 6 G. & J. 386 (Md. 1834) ; Malone v. Carey, 17 Cal. App.
(2d) 505, 62 P. (2d) 166 (1936) ; Donahoe v. Shed, 49 Mass. 326 (1844).
For a Maryland case offering the analogy of the process of attachment
to the process of arrest see Campbell v. Webb, 11 Md. 471 (1857).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS

(1934) See. 124 points out some of the differences

between valid warrants and apparently valid warrants.
Forms and stock materials have mitigated this problem materially.
Typical of such a form is GOLDSBOROUGH, FORMS AND PRECEDENTS, 569.
" Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 341, 4 A. 285 (1886); Smith v. Brown, 119
Md. 236, 86 A. 609 (1912).
' Lewin v. Uzuber, 65 Md. 341, 4 A. 285 (1886).
"A formally deputized private pdrson is a peace officer: State v. Seery,
95 Iowa 652, 64 N. W. 631 (1895) ; Winkler v. State, 32 Ark. 539 (1877).
If orally summoned by a sheriff without formal deputization they
achieve the neither fish nor fowl status of pomse comitatus, says Robinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 18 S. E. 1018 (1893).
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even though deputization has not taken place, if a private
person is called on by an officer to aid him in executing
the warrant, arrest by private person is lawful if the two
acted in concert."' Furthermore, the private person is protected not only by the officer's authority to make arrest
but by his apparent authority; hence, even if the warrant
is not valid nor "fair on its face", reasonable reliance on
the officer's authority exempts the private person. 1
In the discussion concerning the direction of the warrant by the issuer, the ensuing jurisdiction of the one executing the warrant has been pointed out. Statutes cover
the field and Maryland's statute is a reproduction of the
common law in confining the officer to his own county
unless endorsement is made by a magistrate in another
county.6 2 This curtailment of jurisdiction might lead to
acute distress if the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit did not
supply much relief. Cognizance should be taken of the
retention of authority to arrest without warrant if one
has over-stepped his own bounds for arrest with warrant.
But, if the officer has lost jurisdiction for arrest with warrant, he is reduced in power to a private person 8 and the
private person's habiliments are not overly comfortable,
as we shall see later.
Constriction on free execution of a warrant does not
halt at jurisdiction. The executing officer is pungently
told that he must have possession of the warrant at the
time he makes the arrest. 4 If, however, the possessor of
the warrant has enlisted another to help him, whether
private person or peace officer, and in the execution of
that warrant any of those actors in concert has the war65
rant, the possession of that one is attributable to all.
" Commonwealth v. Fields, 120 Pa. Super. 397, 183 A. 78 (1936).
61Cincinnati, N. 0. & P. R. Co. v. Cundiff, 166 Ky. 594, 179 S. W. 615

(1915).
"2Md. Code (1939) Art. 52, Sec. 15.
63 MeCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 94 S.
e, Giddens v. State, 154 Ga. 54, 113 S. E. 386
158 La. 874, 104 So. 747 (1925); Crosswhite
S. E. 242 (1924).
"5Adams v. State, 175 Ala. 8, 57 So. 591
Black, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 31 (1887).

W. 79 (1906).
(1922) ; Hunter v. Laurent,
v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124
(1912); Commonwealth v.
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Actions in concert are defined as transactions in which
the parties are within the senses of each other.66
A warrant is an indicium of authorization; hence, exhibition of a warrant alleviates the early kidnapping dread.
A warrant will apprise the offender of the charge against
him and will state the substance of that charge. In short,
a warrant acts as notice of a formal type. Confusing the
rule with the reason, the law today requires the officer
to exhibit the warrant on request. 67 A reasonable amelioration of the rule excuses failure to exhibit this badge of
authority and manifestation of intent, if an emergency is
reasonably apparent." An officer is not expected to defend
himself from threatened gun play by waving a piece of
paper.
Perhaps the most cloying restriction on the officer's
execution of the warrant and the one which most preys
upon his mind is the requirement of securing the person
named or described in the warrant.6 The officer must
have not only the white soul but the gray brain, for actions
coupled with the purest of intentions will not excuse him
if there is no reasonable mistake of fact generated either
by identity of names or identity of descriptions or some
other extenuating factor.7 0
The employment of various types of warrants could
relieve this responsibility. But, since Entick v. Carrington7 1 first placed the seal of judicial as well as popular
disapproval on general warrants for search, general warrants for arrest allowing anyone-without name or description-to be arrested on suspicion of a crime, are not
to be tolerated.12 Maryland's Constitution, as those of
66See Robinson v. State, 93 Ga. 77, 18 S. E. 1018 (1893).
67RESTATEMENT,

TORTS (1934)

Sec. 128.

11 State v. Brown, 91 W. Va. 709, 715, 114 S. E. 372, 374 (1922) ; Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S. E. 242 (1924). See State v. McDaniel,
115 Ore. 187, 241, 231 P. 373, 376 (1925).
'1 West v. Cabell, 153 U. S. 78, 38 L. Ed. 643, 14 S. Ct. 876 (1894);
Blocker v. Clark, 126 Ga. 484, 54 S. E. 1022 (1906). Cf. Manning v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 42 N. M. 381, 79 P. (2d) 922 (1938) where
arrester was acting without warrant.
7OO'Neill v. Keeling, 288 N. W. 887, 127 A. L. R. 1050 (Ia. 1939);
RESTATEMENT
TORTS (1934)
1
7
72

Sec. 125.

HoWiam's STATE TRiALs (1765).
West v. Cabell, supra n. 69; Blocker v. Clark, supra n. 69.
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most states and the United States, specifically prohibits
these blanket or general warrants.7 8
Nor are warrants valid which are issued with the space
for the name left open to be filled in by the arrester, a
clever evasion of the prohibition against general warrants.
The flimsy device is seen through and brusquely recanted.7 4
Sometimes, an identifying description of an arrestee
is known but the name is not. In filling out the warrant,
the issuing authority will put this description in and then,
as a matter of form, in order to have some name there, put
the name John Doe. This is perfectly proper.75 When,
however, this John Doe is not appended to a description,
it is summarily dismissed as illegal-a scheme like general
warrants or warrants in blank.76 The objectionable feature
to these purposely vague warrants, in thus clothing each
officer with the garment of a competent authority in finding probable cause for issuance, is obvious. The ensuing
depredations on personal liberty and comfort have been
set forth many times. Since the police powers in arrest
without a warrant are large, little harm is occasioned
justice.
D. Flaws of Arrest With Warrant
In criticising the law of arrest with warrant, one is
necessarily driven to the conclusion that arrest without a
warrant will remedy some of the flaws; some, but not all.
For arrest without a warrant has also many limitations, not
the least of which is the restriction on the type of crime
for which an officer or a private person may arrest. Not
the least of these is the restriction that neither officer
nor private person can arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence or view.7 7 For such a crime, a war78 Md. Const., 1867, Dec. of Rights, Sec. 26.
71 Wright v. State, 177 Md. 230, 237, 9 A. (2d) 253 (1939) ; Rafferty v.
People, 69 Ill. 111 (1873).
71Spear v. State, 120 Ala. 351, 25 So. 46 (1898); Wilson v. Lapham,
196 Ia. 745, 195 N. W. 235 (1923).
76 Commonwealth v. Crotty, 92 Mass. 403 (1895).
77 Green v. State, 189 So. 763 (Ala. 1939); Morris v. State, 92 P. (2d)
609 (Okla. 1939).
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rant is necessary and this is only one of several situations
in which a warrant is necessary, as will be later demonstrated. Lest we have an overly cherubic faith in arrest
without a warrant, we are bedeviled with a rule existing
in some states, which even the kindest interpreter must
term an unhappy affliction.
An officer possessing a warrant for a fugitive criminal
hunts down the offender and arrests him. In this situation, the officer could have made the arrest with a warrant
or without a warrant but at the time he seized the criminal
for detention, he proclaimed the arrest by virtue of the
warrant. The warrant in fact was neither valid nor fair
on its face. Many courts greet this situation with a statement that the arrest must be considered illegal, since he
purported to act by virtue of the warrant and the warrant
was bad;s but, if he had purported to act by his right to
arrest without a warrant or with a warrant, the arrest
would have been sanctioned."9 It is surplusage to add that
the states permitting the arrest to be sanctioned on the
right of arrest without a warrant, despite the fact that the
arrest was proclaimed to be by virtue of the warrant, have
a sounder rule. 0 . Nevertheless, the rule first stated has a
great deal of strength and one cannot pooh-pooh any flaw
in the laws of arrest with a warrant by believing that
arrests without a warrant will cover any critical situation.
It is very doubtful indeed that the officer will proclaim
that he is acting not only by virtue of the warrant but by
virtue of the right to arrest without a warrant. Any defects the laws of arrest with a warrant possess are indeed
important.
A police cruiser car, radio equipped, wanders the streets
of a city. Calls come in constantly. Some of these calls
are the result of complaints by private persons which
have been incorporated into warrants. Is the cruiser car
7 Holmes v. Blyler, 80 Ia. 365. 45 N. W. 756 (1890): Perkins, supra
n. 5, 220.
79 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1934) Sec. 128, Comment c.
8OKeel v. State, 176 Miss. 867, 169 So. 653 (1936): and see State v.
Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S. E. 811 (1912).
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to be forced to come back to a central point to get the
warrant? Let us suppose the crime is one for which arrest
without warrant is inappropriate, since it may be a misdemeanor not committed in his presence or view-such
as obtaining money by false pretenses, conspiring to commit crime, various forms of attempts, etc., in some of which
swift apprehension is desirable and issuance of thousands
of warrants unfeasible.
Yet such arrests are illegal. The warrant must be
possessed.
An officer sees a picture in a Rogue's Gallery, knows a
warrant has been issued, encounters the embodiment on
the street-makes an arrest. Must every officer be possessed of a warrant for every misdemeanant? Consider
the heightening of the problem in urban areas. Yet the
law refuses to be budged from the possession of warrant
requirement.
The American Law Institute's code on arrest recommends the possession requisites be dispensed with so long
as a warrant can be shown as soon as practicable.8 1 This
is indeed sound reasoning but the citations they use to
support their statement permit exhibition of the warrant
after arrest-not possession of the warrant after arrest."2
The possession must be concurrent with the arrest.
Moreover, almost any of the requirements may foul the
workings of the police. If a warrant must be had, or the
officer is aware that the warrant is lacking in some vital
respect, obtaining or replacing a warrant may ordinarily
be a small problem; but, if time is important, as it is in
some cases although far from all, justice may be perverted.
We must not falsely postulate that arrests with a warrant
can always be leisurely affairs. Often time is of the
essence.
It is apparent that there are flaws in arrest with a warrant due to changed conditions and changed concepts.
While such matters might properly be left to the judiciary,
statutory enactment gives a policeman much greater se81 A.

12 Id.

L. I.. CODE CRIM. PROC. supra n. 1, 29.
244.
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curity. If forewarned, the officer is forearmed. He need
not jump, then litigate.
From the legislative viewpoint, it is helpful to note the
constitutional problems to surmount. We speak here of
warrants for arrest, not search warrants. Maryland's provision is typical of many others-"That all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to . . . seize any person . . . are
grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants . . . to
apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing . . . the person in special, are illegal, and ought not
be granted.""3 None of the problems advanced would seem
to require constitutional amendment; ordinary legislation
would suffice.
III
ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT

Arrest without a warrant is a horse of a vastly different
hue-a very important hue since it is under the color of
such arrest that most arrests are made. As in arrest by
virtue of a warrant, the arrest, if not in conformity with
the law, gives rise to unhappy consequences, not the least
of which is civil liability.
Whether or not a particular arrest without a warrant is
legal or illegal is a question answerable only with diffidence unless the informant is fully aware of the vagaries
and whimsies of the courts of his state on the subject-a
status the writer does not pretend to have achieved. Basically, the authority under which such arrests can be made
must hurdle the obstacle of a fundamental right, the sanctity of liberty of person-a liberty of which one cannot be
deprived unless compliance has been made with due procS" Md. Const. 1867, Dec. of Rights, Sec. 26.
The Fourth Amendment
is the bulwark in event of Federal jurisdiction. "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
Treatment accorded such an assertion may be noted in Burroughs v.
Eastman, 101 Mich. 419, 59 N. W. 817 (1894).
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ess of law. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment in the event
jurisdiction exists in the United States,8 4 the Fourteenth
Amendment in the event of state jurisdiction,8 5 wag admonishing fingers at us. Let the arrest be reasonable, let
it be just. Almost every State's Bill of Rights has similar
language; and, in Maryland, Article 23 of the Declaration
of Rights invokes the magic words "Law of the Land".8"
We find some courts attempting to place other obstacles
in the path of the law of arrest. Thus in In re Kellam,"7
and Ex parte Rhodes, 88 the court in each instance talks of
the Sixth Amendment-forbidding unreasonable searches
and seizures. Nor have these courts and some others ever
recognized what would appear to be a most obvious set of
facts; namely,
(1) there may be an arrest without a search and
seizure,
(2) there may be a search and seizure without an
arrest, 9
(3) the problem of search and seizure as incidental
to a lawful arrest is a two-headed animal and
each head must be dissected with different
knives.
This paper will not treat search and seizure, and the
citations in which that issue comes up are analyzed with
view only to whether or not the arrest was lawful-not
84

Annotation, 1 A. L. R. 585.
8 Ibid; Komorowski v. Boston Store of Chicago, 341 Il. 126, 173 N. E.
189 (1930).
88 "That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned . . . or in any manner
destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property but . . . by the Law
of the Land."
"Law of the Land" is held synonomous with due process, Solvuca v.
Ryan and Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 270, 101 A. 710 (1917).
87 In
re Kellam, 55 Kan. 700, 41 Pac. 960 (1895).
88 Rhodes v. McWilson, 202 Ala. 68, 79 So. 462 (1918); also Orick v.
State, 140 Miss. 184, 105 So. 465 (1925).
89 Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 158-9, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct.
280 (1925).
The inapplicability of constitutional prohibition against searches and
seizures to arrest situations is further brought out in: United States v.
Rembert (D. C. Tex.) 284 F. 996 (1922); Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209
Mass. 396, 95 N. E. 868 (1911); Re Powers, 25 Vt. 261 (185) ; See
7 BRITISH

RULING CAsEs 688.
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the problem of unreasonable search and seizure with its
inevitable concomitants, immunity against compulsory
self-incrimination and illegally obtained evidence.
The courts in their expostulations on the law of arrest
have made it clear that the objective to be gained is a
maximum of efficiency with a minimum of officiousness.
To reach this middle ground of competent apprehension
without curtailing freedom of movement, the following
factors have been deemed to be of prime significance:
(1) the type of arrester,
(2) the nature of the crime,
(3) the proximity of the arrester to the crime'"presence" or "view",
(4) the state of mind of the arrester-reasonable
suspicion.
The Type of Arrester
With a few unimportant exceptions, arrests without
warrant are made by peace officers, with their acts colorable as such, or by private persons.
It is only natural to confer the greater power upon the
officer-purportedly trained in the apprehension of criminals and, as such, informed as to what constitutes a crime.
On the other hand, multitudinous cases force the conclusion that it is best for the common weal to give the private
person some powers until that dubiously happy time arrives when an officer is present every time a crime is committed.
Incontrovertibly, the police officer's right to make an
arrest without a warrant derogates from the authority
resting on him through his position. That right constitutes a duty. Not only may he act, he must act 0
" 2 HALE P. C. 85; Hoch v. State, 199 Wis. 63, 225 N. W. 191 (1929).
There were no peace officers at early common law, watchmen and constables being their progenitors. Today, we have regular peace officer
bodies and, as in Maryland, we commission many persons in the name
of the State as peace officers who are usually connected with private
industry. Supra, n. 2; also see FoLSoM, Oun POLIC--A HIsTORY OF THE
BALTIMORE FORCE (1888)

24.
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The private person on the other hand, when he possesses the right, nurtures it as a privilege. Only in the
most extreme instance of a felony committed in his presence or view can it be said that the private person must
act.9 1
By the word "duty", we have imposed on the officer a
responsibility of action-action necessarily swift in modern
tempo and growing swifter. But the "privilege" which
the private person ordinarily has had conferred on him,
when weighed in the scales with the fear that he is not
acting correctly (incorrect action entailing civil liability)
is meant to impart a judiciousness and restraint not to be
expected in an efficient officer.
One of the outstanding differences generated by this
necessity of swift action on the officer's part is that he is
given more protection as to the arrests he makes in haste.
Thus, although both are equally protected where a felony
has been committed, and arrest is made on reasonable suspicion of the arrestee as the felon, only the officer enjoys
immunity where there is reasonable suspicion that a felony
has been committed and reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is the felon.92
Whether or not the private person should be so bound
is debatable; for, if the crime be serious enough, it might
be well indeed to enlist all possible aid upon reasonable
appearances. However, the rule does illustrate the workings of the court when each type of arrester stands before
the bar.
Let it be noted that a peace officer outside of his own
bailiwick or jurisdiction is considered a private person for
91Duty
if felony in his presence or view: See State v. Sutter, 71
W. Va. 371, 76 S. E. 811 (1912). Privilege otherwise: McCrackin v:"
State, 150 Ga. 718, 722, 105 S. E. 487 (1920).
Distinguish however the situation where a private person is commanded
by a peace officer to assist him in the making of an arrest. Here the
private person has a duty to act. State v. Ditmore, 177 N. C. 592, 99 S. E.
368 (1919). Is it merely a moral duty with no legal sanction? Compare
Kreuger
v. State, 171 Wis. 566, 177 N. W. 917 (1920); 1 BL. CoMm. 343.
92
Leading case: Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & C. 635 (K. B. 1827);
State v. Browning, 153 Ia. 37, 50, 133 N. W. 330, 336 (1911) ; Carroll v.
Parry, 48 App. D. C. 453 (1919); Weschler and Michael, A Rationale of
the Law o1 Homicide (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 701, 726; Note, 7 B. R. C. 679.
Discussion, infra circa notes 147-148, reveals this rule is not unopposed.

A minority view is gaining strength.
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purposes of arrest.9 3 A private person is considered a
4
peace officer if helping a peace officer.
The Nature of the Crime
A.

Scope of the Crime

Is this crime a felony or a misdemeanor? Oftentimes
the answer to this question is the answer to the question of
the legality or illegality of the arrest-the right to arrest
for felonies encompassing much more territory than the
right to arrest for misdemeanors. However, if the misdemeanor amounts to a breach of peace, the distinction may
be obviated. The right to arrest for any misdemeanor has
been extended to police officers almost universally 5 and
more lately, many jurisdictions have passed statutes allowing private persons to arrest for any misdemeanor rather
than a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace to
which they were formerly restricted. 9 While many argue
this broadening of power places a private person in an
overbearing position, the fact that he acts at his peril, if the
crime has not been committed, will serve to temper his
rash action. It would seem that the private person's rights
should not be extended to such misdemeanors as violation
of ordinances, rules, etc.9 7
There is a further point which deserves discussion. All
the papers on this subject have pointed out this difference
in felony and misdemeanor and blithely proceeded on
their way.
It is natural to assume that members of the legal profession and officers of the law know wherein the distinction
between a felony and a misdemeanor lies. It is especially
98Henson v. State, 120 Tex. Cr. R. 176, 179, 49 S. W. (2d) 463, 464
(1932).
"Harvey v. Bonner Springs, 102 Kan. 9, 169 P. 563 (1917); West
Salem v. Industrial Commission, 162 Wis. 57, 155 N. W. 929 (1916).
A. L. I. CODE CRIM. Poc., supra n. 1, 231-3. See infra n. 135.
"A. L. I. CODE CRIM. PRoc., supra n. 1, 239.
91 In use in this article is that definition of misdemeanor which contemplates all crimes not treason or felony as misdemeanor. Thus breaches
of ordinances and rules constitute misdemeanors. See Graham v. State,
143 Ga. 440, 85 S. E. 328 (1915) forbidding all private persons to arrest
for municipal ordinance violations. Also Veneman v. Jones, 118 Ind. 41,
20 N. E. 644 (1889); but cf. State v. Hunter, 106 N. C. 796, 11 S. E.
366 (1890).
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natural to assume the truth of this precept if the distinction rests on broad and general principles such as the
majority of our states possess, proclaiming as felonies
crimes punishable capitally; or by imprisonment for more
than one year ;95 (or, sometimes, any period at hard labor).
It is even natural so to assume if the designations as misdemeanors and felonies are arbitrary and the mere product
of legislation or judicial fiat without regard to rhyme or
reason. 9 This is the case in Maryland, where assault with
intent to rape is a misdemeanor, carrying with it death,
life imprisonment or up to twenty years in the penitentiary. 10 ° The gravity of the offense makes for no distinction in Maryland.
But, can we reasonably expect private persons to know
when and what are misdemeanors? We can at best rely
on their instinct. If they sense something serious, they will
intervene; otherwise, they will not. Since a system of
public education on this matter is highly unlikely, it would
seem to be best to restrict the right of private persons to
arrest for misdemeanors to misdemeanors equal to a
breach of peace with perhaps an extension to cover petit
larceny and other misdemeanors in which it seems private
persons should act. 10 1 This is an arbitrary solution to a
problem raised by arbitrary treatment but at least has the
merit of keeping private persons in bounds.
B.

Stage of the Crime
A variety of phrasings covering the various phases of
the crime are to be met in the statutes and decisions. We
are familiar with the situation where a felony "has been
0
1BLACK, LAW DIcTIONARY. E. g. U. S. CRIM. CODE, Sec. 335; N. Y.
Sec. 2; CAHILL'S ILL. REV. STATS., Sec. 614, Ch. 38.
At early common law felony comprised crime entailing forfeitures of
goods and land. 4 BL. COMM. 94.
99 In Maryland only those crimes are felonies which were felonies at
common law or have been declared felonies by statute. Dutton v. State,
123 Md. 373, 378, 91 A. 417 (1914) ; Bowser v. State, 136 Md. 342, 345, 110
A. 854 (1920). Common law felonies were murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape, burglary, larceny, arson, sodomy and mayhem. See Note
(1938) 2 Md. L. Rev., 284, for an incisive condemnation of the present
Maryland system of differentiation.
100Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 13; Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91
A. 417 (1914).
101A. L. I., CoDE CRTM. PROc., supra n. 1, 239.
PENAL LAW,

19411

ARREST

committed."'1 2 There is comprehension concerning the
action when a crime "is being committed.' 10 3 Thenceforth,
we depart to shadings in language and meaning such as
"attempting to commit,' 10 4 "apparently committing,"'' °
"preparing to commit,"'0 6 "preparing to renew his commission,"107 "prospective,"108 "anticipated,"' 109 "imminent,"1 0
"threatened,""' "about to commit.""' 2 If mere preparation, so oft-discussed in attempts, is to be condoned, it
would indeed be placing power with impunity in our officers, and, a fortiori, our private persons. Such loosejointed language goes too far. The attempt-preparation
distinction, at best a mealy-mouthed and weasel-worded
refinement, would nevertheless be of some service here, as
our courts have found it of service elsewhere, if with reluctance."'
Unless the crime has reached the stage of attempt, arrest for crime should not be permitted. Prevention of crime by warning of susceptibility to arrest will
serve to protect citizens. Henceforth, in enunciation of
rules herein where "committed" is used, the words "being
committed" or "attempted" should be read in where not
used.
C.

Time of Arrest

In a few states, reverent observance is made to the
common law concept, enlarging the right to arrest in the
lO2 Id.

v. United States (C. C. A. Neb.) 61 F. (2d) 843 (1932);
Zerega
v. United States, 59 App. D. C. 67, 32 F. (2d) 963 (1929).
104
A. L. I. CODE CRIM. Poc., supra n. 1, 238-9; State, em rel. Sadler, v.
District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 225 P. 1000 (1924) ; Byrd v. Commonwealth,
158 Va. 897, 902, 164 S. E. 400, 402 (1932).
105 Bess v. United States (C. C. A. W. Va.) 49 F. (2d) 884 (1931);
certiorari denied, 284 U. S. 628, 76 L. Ed. 535, 52 Sup. Ct. 12 (1931).
108 Cobb v. Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 133 S. E. 42 (1926) ; Mapp v. State,
152 Miss. 298, 120 So. 170 (1929).
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) See. 119c.; Shaw v. State, 113 Tex. Cr.
R. 169, 18 S. W. (2d) 628 (1929).
1o Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 192 N. E. 618, 620 (1934).
103Kelley

207

109 Ibid.

See Martin v. State, 89 Ala. 115, 8 So. 23 (1890).
Sloan v. Schomacker, 136 Pa. 382, 20 A. 525 (1890) ; State, e.r rel.
Thompson, v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 653, 188 S. W. 225 (1916).
11 MARYLAND STATE POLICE DIGEST (1940) 13; Komorowski v. Boston
Store, 341 Ill. 126, 173 N. E. 189 (1930).
118 See the writer's treatment of the attempt problem in Kauffman,
Joinder of Conspiracy and Attempt (1940) 28 Georgetown L. J. 608, 609.
110
112
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night time.1 14 Nor can this concept even today be said to
be entirely devoid of pragmatism. On the other hand,
this practicality may well be covered by the observance
of the courts of taking judicial notice of what time of day
the arrest was made, in order to determine if the apprehension was under reasonable suspicion in the peace officer
(or private person in his limited right to act where reasonable suspicion exists as to the arrestee being the felon,
knowledge certain of the felony's commission). An arrest
may be made on Sunday as well as week days.11
Proximity of the Arrester to the Crime"Presence" or "View"
As might be expected in the more serious offense of
felony- (although as pointed out supra, in Maryland a
felony may or may not be more serious than a misdemeanor)-it makes no difference in the law of arrest
whether or not the arrestee was in the arrester's presence
or view at the time he committed the crime. This rule
might be extended to cover misdemeanors equal to a
breach of the peace without being offensive, but it has not
been so extended.
With Illinois and Iowa as glaring exceptions, 11 6 the rule
exists that one cannot arrest for a misdemeanor, apparently all misdemeanors, if that misdemeanor did not happen in the arrester's presence or view.117 Or, as sometimes
said, one cannot arrest for a past misdemeanor. Since
misdemeanors are ordinarily not serious, chances that the
misdemeanant will flee before a warrant is obtained are
slim. Furthermore, the public does not exhibit such ardent
cooperation in prosecution of misdemeanors, as is found in
prosecution of felonies. Feelings simmer and cool down,
"1 ARCHROLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE (7th Ed. 1860) 90.
Cf. A. L. I., CODE CRIM. PROC. supra n. 1, 237. Id, 242, "arrest may be
made
at any time of day or night."
11 5
A. L. I. CODE CRIM. PRoc., supra n. 1, 242; Blaney v. State, 74 Md.
153, 21 A. 547 (1891).
'-'
ILL. REV. STATS. (1937) C. 38, Sec. 657; IOWA CODE (1935), See.
13468. A few states also allow such arrest in some particular localities,
or for some particular crimes. 6 C. J. S. 593.
1'7 Wynkoop v. City of Hagerstown, 159 Md. 194, 150 A- 447 (1930):
United States v. Vlahos (D. C. Ore.) 19 F. Supp. 166 (1937) ; Fulton v.
City of Philadelphia, 168 Miss. 30, 148 So. 346 (1933).

1941]

ARREST

Saturday night husband and wife scraps are taken with
philosophy come Sunday, witnesses vacillate, grumble at
the fuss; and, in general, it becomes a difficult case to prove
for the policeman, the unhappy goat, who has unsubstantiated hearsay as his evidence, when his complaining witnesses turn blank stares of amazement to the court and
repudiate the making of a statement.
If the misdemeanor, although past, is confessed to, it
might be well indeed to legalize the arrest. It is pleasing
to note that Maryland apparently so holds.""
The words "presence" or "view" are not synonymous." 9
One might view the happening of a crime from some distance by aid of powerful field glasses, or view a crime
commission in a newsreel without being present.
On the other hand, one may be present at the scene of
the crime by the use of any of his senses-hearing, 20 , feel2
ing,121 tasting,"' smelling, 23 and, of course, seeing. '
State of Mind of Arrester-ReasonableSuspicion
Reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds for belief is
here encountered, and shall be constantly encountered in
further promulgation of these rules. This far from unique
question meets far from unique handling. "Mere" suspicion will not suffice. 25 Preferred are the officer's seeing,
hearing, feeling, tasting, smelling, encountered in presence
or view, but information from others, not thus encountered, if credible, will satisfy reasonable suspicion. 2 6
118 Considered infra circa notes 156-159.
110 People v. Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 194 N. Y. Supp. 326 (1922); Gill

v. State, 134 Tex. Cr. R. 363, 115 S. W. (2d) 923 (1938).
120 Hawkins
v. Lutton, 95 Wis. 492, 70 N. W. 483 (1897); but' cf.
People v. Johnson, 86 Mich. 175, 48 N. W. 870 (1891).
121 See Utah Liquor Control Commission v. Wooras, 93 P.
(2d) 455,
4601 (Utah 1939).
22

Id.

21 Compare United States v. Lee (C. C. A. N. Y.) 83 F. (2d) 195
(1936) ; Rocchia v. United States (C. C. A. Cal.) 78 F. (2d) 966 (1935);
State v. Quartier, 114 Ore. 657, 236 P. 746 (1925).
12, Congleton v. Commonwealth, 273 Ky. 282, 116 S. W. (2d) 300 (1938);
State, em rel. Verdis, v. Fidelity and C. Co. of N. Y., 199 S. E. 884 (W. Va.
1938).
122 Larson v. Feeney, 196 Mich. 1, 162 N. W. 275 (1917); Gonzales v.
State, 131 Tex. Cr. R. 15, 16, 95 S. W. (2d) 972 (1936).
120 People v. Filas, 369 Ill. 78, 15 N. E. (2d)
718 (1938) ; State v. Cody,
116 Ore. 509, 241 Pac. 983 (1925) ; Gill v. State, 134 Tex. Cr. R. 363, 115
S. W. (2d) 923 (1938).
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Reasonable suspicion includes presence or view but goes
much further. Even when the information is from a
stranger, it will do, if acquaintance with the stranger
reaches the point that credibility may be established.'2 7
The usual police sources, disseminating news and descriptions by telegrams, radio car descriptions, newspaper descriptions, mail, folders, are apparently sanctioned.'2 8 If
an officer sees B fleeing with A running after him yelling
"Stop thief," he has reasonable cause. 1 29 Or, as it is generally expressed, the suspicion or belief must be generated
by grounds sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent man
in the situation of the arrester to believe the arrestee guilty
of the crime for which the arrest is made or to believe
there is probable guilt. 13 0
Anonymous tips, commonly by mail or phone, are not
enough in themselves to make one reasonably suspicious
although such tips may start the ball of investigation rolling to the point that reasonable grounds shall be revealed.'
Operationof the Four Factorsin Rules for Arrest
The foregoing factors therefore are bare essentials of
a law of arrest discussion. It is only fair to observe that
in many states, the law was there and justification was
then sought for it; in other states, debate and discussion
12People v. Wallace, 245 Mich, 310, 222 N. W. 698 (1929).
Contra:
United States -v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 138 (W. D. Mo. 1939), discussed in
Note (1940) 25 Ia. L. Rev. 368. Cf. United States v. Keown (D. C. Ky.)
19 F. Supp. 639 (1937).
128 Kratzer v. Matthews, 223 Mich. 452, 206 N. W. 982 (1926); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS (1929) Mason's 1935 Supp. Sec. 17149, subsection f; People v.
Euctice, 371 Ill. 159, 20 N. E. (2d) 83 (1939).
This Illinois case must
be construed as permitting such information to give birth to reasonable
suspicion of the arrestee, not suspicion of the commission of the crime
for the 1937 statute has apparently sliced away the ancient common law
prerogative to arrest for such suspicion; factual commission of the crime
being necessary.
129 People v. Kllvington,
104 Cal. 86, 37 P. 799 (1894); but cf. cry of
"hold up" in People v. Mirbelle, 276 II. App. 533 (1934).
-SoMaghan v. Jerome, 88 F. (2d) 1001 (App. D. C. 1937); Graw v. Forge,
183 Ky. 521, 209 S. W. 369 (1919) ; People v. Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 154
N. E. 715 (1926) ; Note (1925) 23 Mich. L. Rev. 390, 392.
"I People v. Ward, 226 Mich. 45, 196 N. W. 971 (1924). Compare
People v. Guertins, 224 Mich. 8, 10, 194 N. W. 561, 562 (1923) ; Cortes v.
State, 135 Fla. 589, 185 So. 323 (1938).

1941]

ARREST

propagated the ensuing rules; in still other states, it is difficult to tell if the rules or the reasons came first-but
whether the deductive process or the inductive process
was used, the following may be said to state the weight of
authority in the law of arrest today:
1. A peace officer or a private person may arrest when
the arrestee has committed a felony in his presence or
18
view. 2
The statutory expression of this principle is merely
reiteration of established common law. The desirability
of this rule is so obvious that it would be superfluous to
indulge in pros and cons.
8
Maryland's concurrence is a matter of course.1
2. A peace officer or a private person may arrest when
the arrestee has committed a felony in or out of his presence or view if the felony, for which the arrest is made,
has been committed and the arrestee has committed it.
This rule also possesses the virtue of agreement in both
18 4
statute and common law.
3. A peace officer may arrest for any misdemeanor
committed in his presence or view by the arrestee but a
private person may arrestunder these circumstances only
if the misdemeanor amounts to a breach of the peace.
The peace officer's right is clear today in almost all
states although common law writings indicated obfuscation
on the subject.3 5 Expediency commands this majority
rule. It would be a sorry state of affairs indeed if speeding
motorists, misusing automobiles in such a fashion as to
endanger life and property, were immune from arrest until
warrants were obtained. In the few states where the law
insists the misdemeanor should amount to breach of
peace13'8 -Blackstone's common law-a change is indicated.
1

"A. L.

I., CODE CRIM. PROC. supra n. 1, 231, 238.

18 HOCHHEIMER, CRIMINAL LAW

(2nd Ed. 1904) 83; Collier v. Vaccaro

(C. C. A. Md.) 51 F. (2d) 17 (1931).
"' A. L. I., CODE CIM. PROc. supra n. 1, 236; Collier v. Vaccaro (C. C.
A. Md.) 51 F. (2d) 17 (1931).
"85 All misdemeanors: RUSSELL, CRIMES (7th Eng. Ed.) 725. Only
misdemeanors amounting to breach of peace: 4 BL. CoMM. 292; 9 HALsnuuy, LAws OF ENGLAND, 299; 2 HALE P. C. 89 (plus all night walkers
and
13 armed riders).
6A. L. I. CODE CraM. Psoc. 8upra n. 1, 232.
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As to the private person's right, the American Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure counted noses in 1930
and came up with some twenty states which professed to
allow a private person to arrest for any misdemeanor.13
Professor Rollin M. Perkins, one of the Institute's later
Codifiers, has used this as basis for a statement that most
states allow private person to arrest for any public offense
committed in his presence or view. 138 This statement is
seriously open to question for a review of the cases indicates that all of the other states either patently or latently
subscribe (with some ramifications) to the rule that the
misdemeanors must amount to a breach of the peace. Furthermore, the Institute Code incorporates the rule, as set
forth in contrasting type, and although the Institute Code
expressly denies being a restatement-restatement qualities seem adhesive characteristics. 13 9
This is a more or less mathematical argument and does
not deserve the consideration that debate of the wisdom
of the rule is entitled to. Hypothetical cases cause us distress no matter which side we prefer.
Let us suppose A, a private person, sees a man sit down
beside a girl in a trolley or subway. The man furtively
picks up the girl's pocketbook. She, absorbed elsewhere,
does not notice. A calls to the man to stop, pursues him
and arrests him. If the jurisdiction is one in which the
grand larceny-petit larceny distinction exists, A will have
made an illegal arrest for a misdemeanor if the bag's content's turn out to be valueless; he is protected-arrest for a
felony-if the bag's contents are valuable.1 40 Should A
pursue the thief? Would he pursue him if he is aware he
Ibid, 239.
Perkins, supra n. 5, 230.
See the pamphlet written by Howland and Goodrich: The American
Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure, 7.
140 Grand larceny equalling a felony, petit larceny a misdemeanor in
many jurisdictions. In Maryland the cleavage is not too clear. Md Code,
(1939) Art. 27, Sec. 388. In many states, larceny from the person,
no matter what the amount, is a felony.
There is no brief here for retention of the felony-misdemeanor distinction. See 2 STFPHENS, HISTORY OF CRMIiNAL LAW OF ENGLAND, 193-196.
But so long as the distinction exists, it should be recognized as a complication with which one must deal.
187
18
280
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must first make a shrewd calculation as to the value of the
bag's contents-a foolhardy job, becoming ever more foolhardy if a watch, ring, or coat is involved?
On the other hand, suppose B is parked illegally and A,
a private person, arrests him. Would the majority of our
citizens resent arrest by a private person for violation of
parking restrictions? The question is not profound.
Thus we have our dilemma-a bull named the misdemeanor. If we insist on enlarging the scope of arrest to
any misdemeanor, we are on his Scylla horn of giving all
persons power, which is overlarge and tends to officiousness offensive to all. If we insist on restricting our power
to misdemeanors amounting to breach of peace, we shall
place on an unbearable position on his Charybdis horn,
men who are acting conscientiously, not pompously.
Astute draftsmanship with a high degree of elasticity
might solve this problem. It cannot be dismissed by saying recovery would only be nominal if the exertion of
arrest was undergone. As previously stated, this is not an
appealing argument to a man undergoing the expenses of
litigation and the moods of a jury. Nor would a change
of the time-hardened narrow definition of breach of peace
be likely to meet approval. It will remain a "violent
public offense" or offenses likely to cause a public dis4
turbance.1 1
As for Maryland, she has conferred on her peace officers
the right to arrest for any misdemeanor committed in their
presence but confined private persons in similar cases to
misdemeanors amounting to a breach of the peace. The
"' Head v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. R. 96, 96 S. W. (2d) 981 (1936) ; Byrd v.
Commonwealth, 158 Va. 897, 902-3; 164 S. E. 400 (1932); HocHEIMER,
CIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1904) 83. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934), See. 116:
"A breach of the peace is a public offense done by violence or one causing
or likely to cause an immediate disturbance of public order."
Also see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940).
Note however that the definition in the Cantwell case is not given in
connection with arrest where "breach of peace" is usually given a rigid
construction. Perkins, supra n. 5, 230. As the Restatement points out,
whether or not a niisdemeanor amounts to a breach of the peace is not
readily resolvable, as the surrounding circumstances play an important
part-especially the comparative privacy or public association. Thus, it
is possible for any number of crimes to be ordinary misdemeanors under
some circumstances, a misdemeanor amounting to breach of peace in
another place, e. g. assault, adultery, larceny, etc.
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leading case is B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Cain,42 wherein a
conductor-private person arrested a rowdy, abusive, profane group of men on his train and delivered them over
to a peace officer.
4. A peace officer or private person may make an
arrest when a felony has in fact been committed, whether
or not in his presence or view, and he has reasonable
ground to believe the arrestee has committed it.
The common law and statutes, declaratory thereof,
unite in stating the peace officer is the possessor of this
143
right.
Private persons do not share this whole-hearted concurrence. The majority of states do make allowance for
this mistake af fact 144 but there are some states which
demand that the private person acts at his peril and he
must face the consequences of any mistake.
As to police officers, the leading cases in Maryland are
Edger v. Burke'4" and Brish v. Carter.1 46 In the former,
an hysterical girl who had been raped gave a description
of her assailant to a deputy sheriff. The officer, knowing
the felony of rape had been committed, arrested a man
reasonably approximating the description. A false arrest
suit by the subsequently vindicated arrestee was dismissed.
Brish v. Carter is illustrative of a different aspect of
reasonable belief. Here was no description of the felon
but a man was found in possession of a stolen horse and
when questioned gave a number of contradictory, vague,
and fancy-flighted stories, as to how the horse came to be
81 Md. 87, 31 A. 801 (1895) ; Wilson Line v. Brown, 164 Md. 698, 166
A. 426 (1933).
Officers: Mitchell v. Lemon, 34 Md. 176 (1870) ; Roddy v. Finnegan,
43 Md. 490 (1876) ; Turner and Stoddard v. Holtzman, 54 Md. 148 (1880) ;
Kane v. State, 70 Md. 546, 17 A. 557 (1889) ; Heyward v. State, 161 Md.
685, 158 A. 897 (1931) ; Callahan v. State, 163 Md. 298, 162 A. 856 (1932);
United States v. Chin (D. C. Md.) 24 F. Supp. 14 (1938).
See also Day and Gorsuch v. Day, 4 Md. 262 (1853) wherein the prevailing nationwide rule is asserted that a magistrate has the powers of
a peace officer but must identify himself as a magistrate. Compare the
rules as to magistrates in A. L. I., CoDE CniM. PRoc. supra n. 1, 229.
I'8 Ibid., 235, 238.
21 Ibid., 240.
1r 96 Md. 715, 54 A. 986 (1903).
2'698
Md. 445, 57 A. 210 (1904).
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in his possession. These were held to justify the arrest
and dismissal of suit for false arrest by the arrestee.
Maryland's law of arrest possesses a caveat insofar as
the right of a private person is concerned in the situation;
but, since the majority rule has the weight of years, authority, and reason on its side and since the bar of the State,
as a whole, has always paid an almost fanatical obeisance
to the mandate of Hochheimer on Criminal Law, 14 7 the
weight of authority rule may probably be safely allotted
to-Maryland.
5. A peace officer may, but a private person may not,
make an arrest under these circumstances:
When he has reasonableground to believe that a felony
has been or is being committed, whether or not in his presence or view, and reasonableground to believe the arrestee
has committed or is committing it.
Whatever quarrel lies with this rule lies not in the
peace officer's authority but the restriction on the private
person. Yet surprising enough, this rule in favor of the
peace officer is not universal. 4 " Let us hypothesize as
follows:
A, a peace officer on a beat, sees B, a total stranger of
evil mien, fumbling with the lock of a store or home; the
owner X, A knows. On being accosted, B tells A, in an unconvincing manner, that he and X are great chums; X gave
him his key, told him to make himself at home, he'd get
there later, is en route from Punxatawney. What is A
to do, assuming he has no way to check up? Allow B to
go in, and if B is lying, prowl to his heart's content? Or
put B to the inconvenience and humility of arresting him
and taking him down to the station for further questioning
-for one cannot force a man to go down for such investigation without arresting him? 4 9 There is little doubt
',7 HOCHHEIMER, op. cit. 8upra n. 133,
1
2 8 A. L. I., CODE CRIM. Pnoc. 8upra n.

83.
1, 235-6.

"' Illinoi8 Crime Survey, Chicago 1929; Report of Committee on Lawless
Enforcement of the Law, Am. Bar As8n. Aug. 19, 1930; see Harness v.
Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N. E. 875 (1902). But cf. Massachusett's helpful
statutory enactment, allowing legal arrest of a "suspicious person". Mass.
G. L. (1932) Ch. 41, See. 98.
Sometimes a citizen will consent to being locked up for a time in order
to give the authorities time to obtain information which will serve to
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which solution the home owner or store owner would
prefer and B, if sincere, should not be resentful. The majority position seems well taken.
But let us suppose the arrester is not A, a peace officer,
but P, a private person, perhaps a watchman with no
police power. Would it be better for him to merely keep
B under a casual surveillance, inform police and let it go
at that? Perhaps this would be preferable, if police are
easily available and there is little chance that the suspected intruder can perform his evil deed and flee ere the
arrival of the police. These ideal conditions are far from
normal. The happier thought is to relieve the private person from a mistake of fact, which may be the products of
appearances which might lead a virtual Solomon to suspect
the perpetration of a crime.
Maryland adheres to the majority view, as set forth in
the contrasting type.15 0
Perkins puts the interesting case of the masked ball
patron, who forgot his key and was climbing in through
a window, to reinforce the idea that a peace officer should
be protected for reasonable mistake of fact. There seems
no strong reason to deny the private person the same right
in these facts, since a felony is involved. A few states look
this far.' 5 '
6. A peace officer may arrest where a misdemeanor
has been committed or is being committed in his presence
or view and he reasonably believes the arrestee committed
or is committing it.
A spectator at a baseball game claps his hands to a
pocket and howls that his wallet has been taken. An alert
officer sees behind the complainant one commonly suspected of being a pickpocket. He observes this suspect
extricate him from the chain of suspicion circumstance has thrust on him.
Such cooperation is not necessarily an arrest. There is no formal charge
-in fact, the motive here is to avoid such onus. Peloquin v. Hibner, 231
Wis. 77, 285 N. W. 380 (1939).
150 Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 35 A. 1089 (1896) ; U. S. v. Murray, 51
F. (2d) 516 (1931).
11 A. L. I., CODE CRIn. PRoc. supra n. 1, 242.
See also CAL. PENAL CODE
(Deering 1931) Sec. 837. English modern view is the same as U. S.
majority: Walters v. Smith (1914) 1 K. B. 595.
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surreptitiously slip something in his pocket. He arrests
him. The arrest is proper.
It is not at all peculiar that this law should exist but
it is peculiar that it has found so little place in the writings on the subject. The American Law Institute found
it of so little importance that they did not include it in their
code, yet a vast number of arrests are so made. 152 Perhaps
the explanation lies in the fact that the cases are often
absorbed in the discussion of presence or view and reasonable belief.
It would require no great temerity to assert that a private person may also so arrest but only if the misdemeanor
amounts to a breach of peace. After all, this is no radical
departure since the same rule exists in felonies and the
inherent distinction between the two crimes is not so great,
in this instance, as to justify a different treatment. So
little case support is found for the statement however that
it is merely advanced and urged.
7. A peace officer may arrestwhere he has reasonable
cause to believe that a misdemeanor has been or is being
committed in his presence or view and reasonablybelieves
the arrestee to be the misdemeanant.
This is an extension well supported by the cases although it, also, is not set forth in clear fashion in legal
writings.'5 3
In State v. Levin,5 a Federal officer, given reliable information of illicit liquor traffic, a misdemeanor, stopped
a car and arrested the occupants and searched the car. He
found no violation of a federal liquor offense but he did
"" Thus we find this rule omitted In the American Law Institute's Code,
although the decisions reveal approval of this type of arrest and it is daily
routine to officers.
1,3 Similarly omitted in the A. L. I. CoD.
Yet Accord: Commonwealth
v. Cheney, 141 Mass. 102, 6 N. E. 724 (1886) ; Goodwin v. State, 148 Tenn.
682, 257 S. W. 79 (1924).
Contra as to peace officers: Edgin v. Talley, 169 Ark. 662, 276 S. W.
591 (1925) ; Adair v. Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 P. 853 (1922).
Private persons have no such authority: Bernheimer v. Becker, 102
Md. 250, 62 A. 526 (1905) ; Lindquist v. Friedman's, Inc., 366 Ill. 232, 8
N. E. (2d) 625 (1937) ; Palmer v. Maine C. R. Co., 92 Me. 399, 42 A. 800

(1899).

154 Baltimore Daily Record, March 18, 1940.
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find lottery slips for sale purposes-a state offense. The
arrest was upheld.
In Silverstein v. State,5 5 an arrest was held lawful
where an officer investigating the numbers racket, under
the prohibition against lotteries, observed a clerk in a
suspected store writing in a book, which he hastily concealed when a warning cry was shouted by the proprietor.
The proprietor was arrested. The arrest was vindicated.
If this rule is commended, rule No. 6 must necessarily
have approbation for it does not go as far.
The foregoing may be stated without trepidation as the
status quo of the law of arrest. Whatever is omitted is, in
the writer's opinion, not permissible in the majority of
states. One such prohibitive law is the so-called past misdemeanor restriction, i. e., not even a peace officer can
arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence
or view. For, as the reader has undoubtedly noted, the
reasonable suspicion cases in felony read "whether or not
in his presence or view" and in misdemeanor read "in his
presence or view".
As previously pointed out, conciliations and vacillations
make this a reasonable rule and the two states permitting
such arrest, Illinois and Iowa, 15 6 have stepped out of bounds
practically-although probably not constitutionally.
There is one situation which, however, should be made
an exception to this rule. In Warner's article,1 57 he describes the case of a radio call which led policemen to a
young man held prisoner by some railroad yardmen; the
previous arrester, a brakeman, having left with his train.
The police arrested him on his admission that he had stolen
some fog lamps nearby. Moreover, it is a common practice to arrest for past misdemeanors to which the misdemeanant has confessed.
What is Maryland's attitude on this vital question?
There is a trilogy of comparatively recent cases which
may answer this matter. All of them have to do with the
255 176 Md. 533, 6 A. (2d) 465 (1939).
216 ILL. REv. STAT. 1939, c. 38, Sec. 657.
rant (1924) 22 Mich. L. R. 673, 706.
15 Warner, supra n. 3, 154.

Wilgus, Arre8t Without a War-
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crime of possessing lottery tickets for resale purposes. In
Heyward v. State,158 Blager v. State,'59 and Sugarman v.
State, 60 the arrestee, in each instance, was suspected of
having lottery tickets in his possession for sale purposes.
In each case, the arrestee eventually admitted the possession for the illegal purpose. Although it is not seriously
discussed in either the Blager case or Heyward case, the
arrest could have apparently been held legal under the
rule that the arrester, a peace officer, had reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was committing a misdemeanor in
his presence or view. Yet, in neither of these cases was
this relied upon; and, when it was set forth as a basis for
the legality of the arrest in the Sugarman case, the suspicion was regarded as "mere" suspicion and not reasonable
suspicion. Having thus failed to seize upon this arrest
precept, how would the courts justify the arrest in the two
cases in which legality of the arrest was upheld?
In the Heyward case, the arrest was held legal because
the misdemeanor was committed in the presence of the
officer. The basis for this statement was the fact that
after being arrested, the arrestee had admitted that he did
possess for sale purposes these number tickets. But, unhappily for the ruling, there exists a well-known maxim,
which states that where the arrest or search is unlawful
to begin with, it is not made lawful by that which afterwards takes place.'1 1
The Blager case reveals a somewhat different set of
facts. Here, the arrestee was apparently accosted first,
then made the admission and then the arrest was made.
Was the arrest legal? Undoubtedly, and this lack of doubt
may be based on either of two grounds:
(1) the admission does reveal a misdemeanor being
committed in his presence before the arrest; or
161 Md. 685, 158 A. 897 (1931).
162 Md. 664, 161 A. 1 (1932).
173 Md. 52, 195 A. 324 (1937), (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 147; (1940) 4
Md. L. Rev. 303.
161 Morgan v. State, 197 Ind. 374, 380, 151 N. E. 98, 100 (1926).
Similarly, in the Sugarman case, supra n. 160, the Maryland. court held
that an officer making an illegal arrest has slipped from his orbit of
official duty, and acts in the same transaction find him not a peace officer.
1.8
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(2) it may well come within the suggestion of an
exception to the peace officer's denial of the right
to arrest for past misdemeanor, the exceptions
being based on confession or admission.
From a reading of the case, one would think that the first
ground was the one relied on, as was stated in a note in the
RFvIEW,' 161a but, when we come to Judge Urner's dissenting
opinion in the Sugarman case, we find that he is under the
impression that the Blager case depends on the exception
to the past misdemeanor rule.16 2 Assuming the latter is
correct, for after all, Judge Urner wrote the Blager case
opinion, the chronology of events must perforce be important. In spite of the Heyward opinion, the following
chronology, assuming no reasonable suspicion, gives birth
to an illegal arrest:
(a) the ultimate arrestee is accosted,
(b) he is arrested,
(c) he confesses.
The following chronology of events is the time chart for a
legal arrest:
(a) the ultimate arrestee is accosted,
(b) he confesses,
(c) he is arrested.
But the contention may be raised: Isn't the arrestee in
either chronology committing a misdemeanor in the officer's presence or view? The flaw in this contention is
that, as in cases of concealed weapons or transporting liquor
illegally, unless the officer is conscious by one of his senses
that the misdemeanor is now being committed before him,
the misdemeanor is, of course, not being committed in his
162- (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 147, 153, noting Sugarman v. State, supra
n. 160.
102 173 Md. 52, 61, 195 A. 324, 328 (1937).
Note that it may be possible
for a person to confes8 he is committing a misdemeanor and yet not be
actually committing a misdemeanor in the officer's presence or view. The
confessor may be lying to conceal another, or in a malicious humor, etc.
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presence or view.168 The cases hypothesize that there is
no reasonable suspicion; therefore, also as with concealed
weapons and transporting liquor, unless tell-tale bulges or
sight of the illicit article indicates the crime, the officer
cannot claim a crime committed in his presence or view.
The Sugarman case involves the first chronology. The
arrestee was arrested, then confessed; attempted to bribe
the officer, then panic-stricken, broke and ran; was pursued and caught and "re-arrested". The question of the
legality of the arrest on that chronology is definitely decided as illegal; the real discussion in this case centering
upon whether or not the subsequent fleeing after such
initial arrest and admission may be said to justify a legal
arrest as for a misdemeanor committed in his presence or
view. In other words, the second chronology is appended
to the first. The court rightly decided that the unlawful
arrest was not made lawful by later actions. Between the
Heyward and Blager cases and the Sugarman case, we find
an enlightening interpretation in an opinion by the then
64
Attorney-General O'Conor.'
Reconciling an apparent inconsistency in a former opinion, 65 the opinion sets forth the law as permitting peace
officers to arrest without warrant for misdemeanors out
of their presence or view, if the misdemeanant confesses
upon being accosted. It further assumes a factual setup
in which an officer, being notified of drunken driving,
accosts a man reeking of liquor in a parked car and obtains
from him an admission that he has recently been operating
that car under the influence of liquor. In this case, the
opinion states, the officer should be and is protected. So,
as to Maryland's attitude on the subject, it would seem
that although the right to arrest for past misdemeanor
0

' 3 Pickett v. State, 99 Ga. 12, 25 S. E. 608 (1896) ; Haltom v. State,
58 Okla. Cr. R. 117, 50 P. (2d) 744 (1935) ; Morris v. State, 92 P. (2d)
609 (Okla. 1939); Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588 (1922).
Illustrating the chronological chart, see Johnson v. State, 179 Miss. 446,
176 So. 164 (1937); State v. Gulczynski, 2 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 120, 120

A. 88 (1922).

1621 Ops. Atty. Gen. Md. 300 (1936).
10521 Ops. Atty. Gen. Md. 298 (1936). See for very similar facts and
treatment State v. Murphy, 4 N. J. Misc. 957, 134 A. 900 (1926).
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is denied on liberty-loving grounds, with fear that evidence
in a case will dissolve in thin air, against fear of frameups
and errors, such arrest will be upheld if a confession is
made.
These "weight of authority" rules are, as all weight of
authority rules are, handy containers with no great nourishment to jurisprudes. For their sustenance, there must
be cans labeled "modern trends." One of the most outstanding of these modern trends is the rule that a peace
officer may arrest when the arrestee has committed a
felony, although not in the presence or view of the officer.
Some seventeen states now have this provision'66 and the
loose-jointed context seems to imply that it covers a situation where:
(1) the officer has not been reasonable in his suspicion of the arrestee but has, by the fortune of
war, stumbled onto a fleeing felon, or
(2) the officer, in making the arrest, has arrested
the proper person for the proper felony but
without having had reasonable cause to arrest
him in the first place for this felony.
In short, the law ordinarily requires the officer to have
reasonable cause to believe that this suspect had committed
the felony for which the arrest is made; and, therefore,
even though he accidently stumbled on the proper party
for the felony for which arrested or the party had committed other felonies, he was not protected from a suit for
167
false arrest.
The statutes in these seventeen states are prima facie to
be interpreted that these "dumb but lucky" officers are not
to be censured. However, the statutes are comparatively
new and it is not unlikely that the courts will interpret
them on common law principles, narrowing the scope of
116 A. L. I., CODE CRIM. Poc. supra n. 1, 234.
1"Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons (1933), 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 749, 751. To be sure, the arrest is often not accidental stumbling.
It may be the product of follow-up on a tip by an informer, not regarded
as giving rise to reasonable suspicion in a particular case.
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arrest until they have been phrased in more solidified form,
specifically pointing out the new power.
On this question of statutory enunciation of this problem and codifications, one cannot be over-opprobrious of
the hastily drafted and clumsily-phrased statutes. For example: Iowa and Illinois in blissful self-congratulation on
their progressive spirit enacted what they believe to be fine
code models of the law of arrest. Their beatific smiles vanished when various observers on the subject pointed out
that although they had enlarged the rights of private persons and peace officers in some respects, in other respects,
they had emasculated a fundamental right belonging to
peace officers, i. e., the right to arrest where the offense
has not in fact been committed but they have reasonable
grounds to believe it has been or is being committed. 16
Here, the obvious intention to protect those acting conscientiously in the enforcement of their duties was circumvented by poor draftsmanship.
IV
EFFECTING ENTRANCE AND EXIT TO BUILDINGS

In the pursuit of duty or privilege, the arrester may
find himself blocked by the doors and windows of an enclosure, either a dwelling house or some other building,
in which the arrestee has sought refuge. This building,
even if a home of arrestee or another, is no sanctuary; for,
when arrest on behalf of the state is the aim, a man's
home is not his castle. "No man can have a castle against
the king."'169
Assuming the arrest, if made in the open, would be
legal, either by an officer with a valid warrant or an officer or private person acting without a warrant but possessing legal justification, does the fact that arrestee has
"ISnyder v. Thompson, 134 Ia. 725, 728, 112 N. W. 239, 241 (1907) discussed by Perkins, supra n. 5, 236. Coughlin, Arrest Without Warrant
(1940) 5 John Marshall L. Q. 352 discusses the present Illinois law.
16 The famous phrase in Semayne's Case, 5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194
(K. B. 1604) adopted in State v. Mooring, 115 N. C. 709, 711, 20 S. E. 182
(1894).
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obtained the shelter of a building or home offer him any
additional protection?
It is true that the arrester must, before breaking any
doors or windows, demand admittance and explain the reason for the demand.17 0 This is a rule of property protection as well as a safeguard to the arrestee. It merely calls
for an evincement of authority; and, as in other cases of
arrest with or without a warrant, may be foregone in a
171
crisis where action, not explanation, is called for.
A perusal of the authorities indicates that the arrestee
does acquire a partial immunity by reaching a home. One
is not permitted to break doors and windows of a home
in any case in which a lawful arrest might be made, yet
one is so permitted if it is any other type of building' 72 the castle idea in play again.
If the building is a home, curtailment of the right to
break doors and windows to arrest is visible. Acting with
a warrant or without a warrant will make no difference
in the majority of states.' 7T The right to break doors and
windows of a home, rather than coinciding with a right to
make an arrest, stops much earlier. Officers may break
doors and windows to arrest:
(1) one who committed a felony in their presence
7
or view, 1
(2) one who committed a felony in or out of their
presence or view and this person is reasonably
1 75
suspected,
170 Gray v. Williams, 230 Ala. 14, 160 So. 715 (1934); Commonwealth
v. Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190 (1875).
171 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
Sec. 128. Thus notice was required in
arrest with a warrant, arrest without a warrant, breaking doors and
windows in pursuance of either type of arrest, yet such notice was always
excused where an emergency was extant or notice superfluous.
172
f. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) Sec. 129-A civil arrest analogy
which gives a fortiori credence to the statement above.
178 Limit with warrant:
State v. Oliver, 2 Houst. 585 (Del. 1863);
Commonwealth ex rel Volpe v. County Prison, 5 Pa. Dist. R. 635, 5 A. L. R.
263 (1896). Limit without warrant: Hart v. State, 195 Ind. 384, 145
N. E. 492 (1924). Cf. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190 (1875).
Compare 6 C. J. S. 615.
174 Smith v. Tate, 143 Tenn. 268, 227 S. W. 1026 (1921): 1 WHARTON.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (10th ed.) Sec. 51.
175 U. S. v. Dean (D. C. Mass.) 50 F. (2d) 905 (1931).
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(3) if it is reasonably suspected a felony has been
is reasonably suscommitted and the arrestee
17
pected to be the felon, 6
(4) for a misdemeanor in their presence or view
77
amounting to a breach of the peace.'
A private person may break doors and windows if he is
pursuing an arrestee:
(1) who has committed a felony in his presence or
view,

17 8

(2) who has committed a felony whether or not in
his presence or view and he reasonably suspects
1 7' 9
the arrestee to be the felon.
Thus, it may be seen that the right to break doors or
windows in the course of arrest is considerably narrower
than the right to arrest. s0 Perkins takes issue with the
American Law Institute on this point, believing the two
rights coincidental; and, that "breaking the close" rules
have been enunciated without due regard to the changes
in the rules of arrest'8 ' but such authority as exists seems
2
to side with the Institute.'1
Practically speaking, there seems to be no good reason
why the powers should not be equi-distant. The malodorous Maryland distinction between felony and misdemeanor again will be disturbing, with its characterization
of aggravated assaults as misdemeanors, but what little
can be done should be done. The road permitting arrests
for all misdemeanors should be opened to peace officers,
even if the private person is restricted to misdemeanors
amounting to a breach of the peace.
Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 95 N. E. 868 (1911).
People v. Woodward, 220 Mich. 511, 190 N. W. 721 (1922).
"I ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE (7th ed. 1860) 113, 115.
17
2 HALE P. C. 82.
8
A. L. I., CODE CRIM. PRoc. supra n. 1, 253-256. A comparison of the
rules of arrest set forth with the rules for breaking doors will indicate
the drastic difference.
181 Perkins, 8upra n. 5, 245.
112 6 C. J. S. 615; 4 AM. JuR. 59.
176
17
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Police broadcasting further intensifies the problem.
Relying on the central station's often vague information-a
cry for help-radio car officers should not be forced to
pause and consider if the chain of causation started by
a scream reasonably leads to a felony or a misdemeanor.
The central bureau's information should be solid ground
for reasonable suspicion of either type of crime and it is no
great deprivation of rights for a citizen to know that his
obstinancy in refusing to admit police investigating a
crime will be met by forcible entry. If a false alarm, it is
slightly troublesome, if not, serious crime may be averted.
Warner states that on the one occasion a householder was
obdurate on letting police enter, a negro had a white girl
1 3
in a closet.
Despite an early Maryland case to the contrary, the universal rule is that one who breaks into buildings is not
acting at his peril, if the person sought is not in the building. Reasonable action excuses."8
Where an officer or private person has broken into a
building to effectuate an arrest and finds himself involuntarily confined therein, he may free himself by breaking
doors or windows.8 5
Similarly, if one knows of an officer or private person
so confined, he may break doors or windows in order to
86
achieve release.
V
CONCLUSION

This paper has been primarily concerned with the legality or illegality of an arrest. The cicerone has been the
power broken down to privilege or duty. The exercise of
that power has been discussed to some extent; but for those
who possess a hunger for the entire menu of the law of
arrest, they will not find their appetites satisfied here.
188 Warner, supra n. 3, 153.
18'Commonwealth v. Irwin, 83 Mass. 587 (1861); Commonwealth v.
Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190 (1875): compare the language in Hall v. Hall,
6 G. & J. 886, 389 (Md. 1834).
1851 BisHop, NErW CmMINAL PRoc DuRE (2d ed. 1913) Sec. 203.
18 0 A. L. I. CODE CRim. PROC., supra n. 1, 256-7.
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Space does not permit discussion of such phases of the
law of arrest as arrest and subsequent release of innocents,
and arrest and subsequent release of those who are guilty
of a technical violation but who have been confined more
for their own good than anything else, e. g., helpless vagrants and drunks. Nor have we touched the absorbing
question of the use of force in arrest with its fascinating
problems of killing a fleeing arrestee, killing a resisting
arrestee, and the culpability involved in the arrestee killing
his arrester. All these are worthy of more than sparing
study.
The law of arrest has suffered a fate not uncommon
to many other phases of law. The spawn of judicial and
social thought, to many it has long been considered mature
in its present state. To those more keenly cognizant of
the change in the requirements of an administration of
criminal justice, the doctrine is not only mature, it is overripe.
Especially would this seem true in Maryland, where the
felony-misdemeanor distinction gives a rare embellishment. A codification for the state of Maryland would be
a worthwhile achievement;" s7 but only if the codification
carries within it an insight of the shape of things to come
and the things that are, can it be hoped to have accomplished more than the cabalistic monstrosities now thrust
on some other states.
.87 It
would be an unparalleled boon to peace officers. See Stinnett v.
Virginia, 55 F. (2d) 644, 647 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932). This is said in full consciousness of the existence of the recent MARYLAND STATE POLICE DIGEST
and THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DIGEST. It seems to the writer that the
references to arrest in each of these works are hazy and incomplete and
although the wording is no doubt purposefully couched in lay language
to better secure the understanding of officers, the avowed intention of informing the officer of his fundamental rights and liabilities is defeated
by the failure to state with legal precision those principles which will be
judged with legal precision.
Nor will the present CODE, the ancient doctrination of HOCHHEiMERS
CRIMINAL LAW, nor the casual references in other Maryland materials help
the befogged arrester a great deal. The vast wealth of general material
will serve to increase his knowledge and at the same time the very bulk
of material will shadow many angles.
Maryland, traditionally common law, has gone Code for other purposes.
It would do well to go Code to remove one of many stumbling blocks in the
smooth passage which should lead to criminal justice.

